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In this paper we investigate the use of quantum information to share classical secrets. While
every quantum secret sharing scheme is a quantum error correcting code, the converse is not true.
Motivated by this we sought to find quantum codes which can be converted to secret sharing schemes.
If we are interested in sharing classical secrets using quantum information, then we show that a class
of pure [[n, 1, d]]q CSS codes can be converted to perfect secret sharing schemes. These secret sharing
schemes are perfect in the sense the unauthorized parties do not learn anything about the secret.
Gottesman had given conditions to test whether a given subset is an authorized or unauthorized
set; they enable us to determine the access structure of quantum secret sharing schemes. For the
secret sharing schemes proposed in this paper the access structure can be characterized in terms
of minimal codewords of the classical code underlying the CSS code. This characterization of the
access structure for quantum secret sharing schemes is thought to be new.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum secret sharing schemes deal with the distri-
bution of an arbitrary secret state among n parties (or
shares) using quantum states such that only authorized
subsets can reconstruct the secret. One can broadly clas-
sify quantum secret sharing schemes into the category of
schemes allowing one to (a) share quantum secrets and
(b) share classical secrets. This paper focuses on schemes
of the second category (b).
Quantum secret sharing schemes of both categories
were introduced by Hillery, Buzek, and Berthiaume [1].
Classically, one can always associate an error-correcting
code to a perfect secret sharing scheme—though deter-
mining the access structure of the associated scheme is
in general a very hard problem. Additionally, one can
also derive a secret sharing scheme from a classical code,
as was first illustrated by the work of Massey [2]. It
is not surprising therefore that one finds connections
between quantum secret sharing schemes and quantum
codes. The connection between quantum secret sharing
schemes and quantum codes was first made explicit in
the work of Cleve et al. [3] and in greater depth by
Gottesman in [4]. In fact Cleve et al [3] showed that
quantum threshold schemes can be derived from quan-
tum MDS codes and gave an explicit method for these
schemes. More recently, Rietjens et al. [5] showed that a
((k, 2k−1)) quantum threshold scheme exists if and only
if a [[2k − 1, 1, k]]q quantum MDS code exists, thereby
extending an earlier result found in [3]
However, the correspondence between quantum codes
and quantum secret sharing schemes does not appear to
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be as strong as in the classical case. In general, one
cannot derive a perfect quantum secret sharing scheme
from a quantum code. However, if we restrict our secrets
to being classical, then we can relate a pure [[n, 1, d]] CSS
code to a secret sharing scheme, as we will show below.
Using quantum information to secure classical secrets
has been studied earlier in [1, 4, 6]. Gottesman had given
a convenient characterization of the access structure of
secret sharing schemes in [4]. For the schemes proposed
in this paper we provide an alternative characterization
which can perhaps be extended to more quantum state
sharing schemes. The access structures of the secret shar-
ing schemes proposed in this paper can be characterized
using the notion of minimal codewords, a concept which
was introduced by Massey [2] in the context of classical
secret sharing. Additionally, we draw upon the work of
Gottesman [4] to link these ideas.
A. Background: Quantum Secret Sharing
Let the parties of a secret sharing scheme be P =
{P1, . . . , Pn}. Any subset of P that can reconstruct the
secret is called an authorized set. Subsets which cannot
reconstruct the secret are called unauthorized sets. The
collection of authorized sets is called the access struc-
ture of the scheme and denoted by Γ. The collection of
unauthorized sets is called the adversary structure and
denoted by A. Clearly, Γ ∪ A = 2P , the power set of P .
A minimal authorized set is one which can be used to
reconstruct the secret but no proper subset of which can
reconstruct the secret. Clearly any subset which contains
a minimal authorized set is also authorized. The minimal
access structure of the secret sharing scheme is the mul-
tiset consisting of minimal authorized sets. We denote
a secret sharing scheme with (minimal) access structure
Γm as (Σ,Γm).
2Of course, the secret sharing scheme must specify more
than the access structure. It must specify a means to
encode the secret into the n different shares and how any
authorized set can recover the secret. In the language of
quantum error correction these two tasks translate into
encoding and decoding of a quantum state which has
been transmitted through a noisy quantum channel, in
this case the quantum erasure channel. A secret sharing
scheme is said to be perfect if
i) an authorized set exactly reconstructs the secret
ii) an unauthorized cannot extract any information
about the secret
Essentially, any perfect secret sharing scheme must sat-
isfy two requirements. On one hand, there is the require-
ment of secrecy; any unauthorized set must know noth-
ing about the secret. On the other hand, there is the
requirement of recoverability; any authorized set must
be able to reconstruct the secret. One can also give a
quantum information theoretic characterization of these
requirements as was done in [7]. A characterization of
these requirements for quantum secret sharing schemes
can be found in [4], see also [3]. In particular, for clas-
sical secrets this formulation is given as follows, see [4,
Theorem 9] for details.
Lemma 1 (Gottesman). Suppose we have a set of or-
thonormal states |ψi〉 encoding a classical secret. Then a
set T is an unauthorized set iff
〈ψi|F |ψi〉 = c(F ) (1)
independent of i for all operators F on T . The set T is
authorized iff
〈ψi|E |ψj〉 = 0 (i 6= j) (2)
for all operators E on the complement of T .
We can state these conditions more informally. For an
unauthorized set T , there is no measurement that can
be be performed on the qubits in the support of T that
can extract any information about the states |ψi〉. Since
an authorized set T is to recover the secret, it can in
effect correct erasures on the complement of T . If the
conditions hold for any orthonormal basis of the space
spanned by |ψi〉, then these states can also be used for
sharing quantum states, see for instance [4, Theorem 1],
[3, Theorem 7].
Remark 2. We need not consider all operators on T ,
we only need to consider a basis of the operators on T .
For q-ary quantum systems schemes this basis of error
operators can be identified with vectors in F2nq .
We assume some background in (nonbinary) quantum
codes, the reader can refer to [8] for more details. Let
q be the power of a prime p. Let B = {|x〉 | x ∈ Fq}
denote an orthonormal basis for Cq. For a, b ∈ Fq, we
define operators X(a) and Z(b) by
X(a) |x〉 = |x+ a〉 Z(b) |x〉 = ωtrq/p(bx) |x〉 , (3)
where x ∈ Fq, ω = ej2pi/p, and j =
√−1. These operators
form a basis for error operators over a single qudit. Over
n qudits, we define the error operator
X(a)Z(b) = X(a1)Z(b1)⊗ · · · ⊗X(an)Z(bn)
for a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Fnq and b = (b1, . . . , ab) ∈ Fnq .
The error operators E = {X(a)Z(b) | a, b ∈ Fnq } form a
basis for error operators over n qudits. We shall often
denote X(a)Z(b) by its representative over F2nq as (a|b).
We say that an error operator X(a)Z(b) has a support
over T ⊆ {1, . . . , n} if (at, bt) 6= (0, 0) for all t ∈ T , and
(at, bt) = (0, 0) otherwise.
II. SHARING CLASSICAL SECRETS
In this section we shall show that a pure [[n, 1, d]] CSS
code can be converted into a secret sharing scheme. We
shall also characterize the access structure of the scheme
by using the notion of minimal codewords. Throughout
this section we assume that the [[n, 1, d]] code under con-
sideration has been derived from a classical code C ⊇ C⊥
with the parameters [n, k, d]q whose parity check matrix
is given as H =
[
In−k P
]
. The dual code C⊥ is defined
as C⊥ = {x ∈ Fnq | x · c = 0 for all c ∈ C}. The stabilizer
(matrix) of the CSS code is given as
S =
[
H 0
0 H
]
. (4)
Recall that the errors detectable by the CSS code are in
F2nq \ (C⊕C) or C⊥⊕C⊥, where C⊕C is the direct sum
of C with itself. The undetectable errors are in (C⊕C)\
C⊥ ⊕ C⊥).
To define the minimal access structure of the secret
sharing scheme we need the notion of minimal codewords.
Let x, y ∈ Fnq , then x is said to cover y if the support of
x contains the support of y. Alternatively, yi is zero
whenever xi = 0, where we assume that x = (x1, . . . , xn)
and y = (y1, . . . , yn). A codeword x ∈ C is said to be a
minimal codeword if
i) its left most component is 1 and
ii) it does not cover any other codeword of C except
scalar multiples of x.
A codeword which only satisfies ii) is said to be a minimal
support. Every minimal codeword is of course a minimal
support. Minimal codewords were first introduced by
Massey in the context of classical secret sharing schemes,
enabling a one to one correspondence with minimal au-
thorized sets. Minimal supports play an important role
in studying the local equivalence of stabilizer states. We
also need the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let Q be a pure [[n, 1, d]]q CSS code derived
from C⊥ ⊆ C ⊆ Fnq . For any two vectors x, y ∈ C \ C⊥
we have x · y 6= 0. If q = 2, we have x · y = 1 and d odd.
3Proof. Given the parameters of the quantum code the
codes C and C⊥ must have the parameters [n, k, d]q and
[n, n − k = k − 1, d]q respectively. Since C 6= C⊥, it
follows that there is at least one vector c in C \C⊥, that
satisfies c · c 6= 0. Because dimC − dimC⊥ = 1 we infer
that c and C⊥ generate C. Therefore for any two vectors
x, y in C \ C⊥ we can write them as x = αc + sx and
y = βc+ sy for some sx, sy ∈ C⊥ and α, β ∈ F×q . Hence,
x · y = (αc + sx) · (βc + sy) = αβ(c · c) 6= 0. If q = 2,
then it follows that x · y = 1. In particular x · x = 1,
which implies that the weight of x must be odd. Since
the minimum distance depends on the weight of elements
in C \ C⊥, we conclude that d is odd.
A. Proposed Secret Sharing Scheme
First we shall describe the scheme and then show that
it is indeed a valid secret sharing scheme.
Theorem 4. Let Q be a pure [[n, 1, d]]q CSS code de-
rived from a classical code C⊥ ⊆ C ⊆ Fnq . Let E be the
encoding given by the CSS code
E : |i〉 7→
∑
x∈C⊥
|x+ ig〉 i ∈ Fq, (5)
where g ∈ C \C⊥ and g ·g = β. Distribute the n qudits as
the n shares for a secret sharing scheme, Σ. The minimal
access structure Γm is given by
Γm =
{
supp(c) | c is a minimal codeword in C \ C⊥ }(6)
Let c = αg+sc be a minimal codeword for some sc ∈ C⊥.
The reconstruction for the authorized set supp(c) derived
from c is to compute
(αβ)−1
∑
j∈supp(c)
cjSj , (7)
where Sj is the share of the jth party.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is a little long, so we
shall break it into parts. First we shall show that the
minimal codewords define authorized sets i.e., they can
recover the secret. Next we shall show that the associated
authorized sets are minimal. Thirdly, we shall show that
Γ is complete i.e., every minimal authorized set is in Γ.
1) Recoverability: Let c be a codeword in C \ C⊥, not
necessarily minimal. Then c can be written as c =
αg + sc for some sc ∈ C and α ∈ F×q . Adjoining
an ancilla and computing the dot product with c =
αg + sc we get
|0〉
∣∣ig + C⊥〉 7→ ∑
x∈C⊥
|c · x+ c · ig〉 |x+ ig〉 ,
=
∑
x∈C⊥
|c · x+ αg · ig + sc · ig〉 |x+ ig〉 ,
Since c, g ∈ C \ C⊥ and x, sc ∈ C⊥ we have c · x =
sc · ig = 0. Let g · g = β, then by Lemma 3, β 6= 0 and
is invertible in Fq. It follows
|0〉 ∣∣ig + C⊥〉 7→ |αβi〉 ∑
x∈C⊥
|x+ ig〉 .
Since both α and β are known the secret can be re-
covered from the ancilla which is in the state |αβi〉.
This proves that these subsets can reconstruct the se-
cret and they indeed define authorized sets. So every
code word in C \C⊥ can define an authorized set but
it need not be minimal. Consequently every minimal
codeword in C \ C⊥ also defines an authorized set.
2) Minimality of the authorized sets: Now let c be a
minimal codeword. We shall show that in this case
that any proper subset of supp(c) cannot reconstruct
the secret. Let T be a proper subset of supp(c). Let
the error operator E = (a|b) be supported in T where
a, b ∈ Fnq , then (a|b) cannot be a codeword in C ⊕ C.
Suppose it were a codeword in C⊕C, then both a, b ∈
C. Since E is nontrivial at least one of a and b is
nonzero and covered by c, but then c would not be
a minimal codeword. Therefore any error on T must
be in F2nq \ (C ⊕ C). But this means that any such
operator is detectable by the quantum code Q. If it
is detectable, then it must not reveal any information
about the encoded states. In particular, it implies
that T satisfies equation (1). Therefore every proper
subset of supp(c) is an unauthorized set. This shows
that supp(c) is a minimal authorized set.
3) Completeness of Γm: Next we show that all minimal
authorized sets are in Γm. Assume that there exists
a minimal authorized set T which is not in Γm. Then
T must satisfy equation (2). Additionally, T fails to
satisfy equation (1) while every proper subset of T
being an unauthorized set does satisfy equation (1).
This forces the existence of an operator E = (a|b),
with supp(E) = T , that violates equation (1). Now E
cannot be in Fnq \ (C ⊕C) or C⊥⊕C⊥, as these oper-
ators are detectable and cannot violate equation (1).
Therefore, E must be in (C ⊕ C) \ (C⊥ ⊕ C⊥). Fur-
ther, (a|b) ∈ C ⊕ C implies that a, b ∈ C. Now both
a, b cannot be in C⊥ ⊂ C as then (a|b) would be en-
tirely in C⊥ ⊕ C⊥ and it would be detectable and
cannot define an authorized set. So at least one of
a, b is in C \ C⊥. Without loss of generality let us
assume that a ∈ C \ C⊥. But we already saw in
step 1), that any codeword in C \ C⊥ defines an au-
thorized set. So supp((a|0)) = supp(a) is itself an
authorized set. Since (a|b) is a minimal authorized
set, supp(a) = supp(a|b) = T .
Suppose that a is not a minimal codeword. Then there
is some vector in C that is covered by a and is not a
scalar multiple of a. First we show that there exists
no d ∈ C such that supp(d) ( T . If supp(d) was a
proper subset of supp(a), then d cannot be in C \C⊥
4as it would then define an authorized set that is a
proper subset of the minimal authorized set T . If d
is in C⊥, then there exists a linear combination of a
and d with support strictly a subset of T . Further this
linear combination is also in C \C⊥ and by step 1) it
would define an authorized set violating the minimal-
ity of T . Therefore any d ∈ C covered by a and not
a scalar multiple of a must have supp(d) = T . But
this implies that C contains a linear combination of a
and d with support strictly less than T violating our
previous conclusion that there exists no such element
in C. Therefore a is a minimal codeword of C and
it lies in C \ C⊥. (If the left most component of a is
not 1 we can choose a scalar multiple of it so that it
is 1. In any case, a and its scalar multiples have same
support and they correspond to the same (minimal)
authorized set).
Since a codeword of minimum distance does not cover
any other codeword, there always exists a scalar multi-
ple of it which is a minimal codeword. Therefore, the
minimal access structure always contains the sets corre-
sponding to the support of the every minimum distance
codeword in C \ C⊥.
Corollary 5. In the secret sharing scheme specified in
Theorem 4, the support of every minimum distance code-
word in C \ C⊥ gives rise to a minimal authorized set.
If q = 2, then we can simplify the reconstruction pro-
cess, we only need to take the parity of the parties in the
minimal authorized set.
Corollary 6. Let Q be a pure [[n, 1, d]]2 CSS code de-
rived from a classical code C⊥ ⊆ C ⊆ Fn2 . Let E be the
encoding given by the CSS code
E : |i〉 7→
∑
x∈C⊥
|x+ ig〉 i ∈ F2, (8)
where g ∈ C \ C⊥. Distribute the n qubits as the n
shares for a secret sharing scheme, Σ. The minimal ac-
cess structure Γm is given by
Γm =
{
supp(c) | c is a minimal codeword in C \ C⊥ }(9)
The reconstruction for an authorized set is to simply com-
pute the parity of the set (into an ancilla).
The secret can be encoded using the encoding methods
of CSS codes, see [9]. Reconstructing the secret for these
schemes is extremely simple as shown below. We will
need the multiplier gateM(c) and the generalized CNOT
gate, A shown below.
c •

i) ii)
Their action on the basis states is given as:
i) M(c) |x〉 = |cx〉 , c ∈ F×q
ii) A |x〉 |y〉 = |x〉 |x+ y〉
The recovery as given in equation (7) is computed by
performing the following operation for each cj 6= 0.
|Sj〉 cj • c−1j
|anc〉 
The final scaling by (αβ)−1 can be done classically.
B. Illustration
We illustrate the strategy using a [[11, 1, 3]] CSS code
[10] it can be derived from a code C with the following
generator and parity check matrices.
G =


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1


(10)
H =


1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1

 (11)
Let us encode the secret
|s〉 7→
∑
c∈C⊥
|c+ se〉 , (12)
where e =
[
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
]
. The secret
sharing scheme assumes that we distribute each qubit
as a share. The minimal access structure of the secret
sharing scheme is given by Γm.
Γm =


{3, 10, 11}; {6, 9, 11}; {4, 7, 11}; {2, 5, 11};
{1, 8, 11}; {2, 3, 4, 6, 8};
{4, 5, 6, 8, 10}; {1, 3, 4, 5, 6}; {1, 2, 4, 6, 10};
{3, 4, 5, 8, 9}; {2, 4, 8, 9, 10}; {1, 2, 3, 4, 9};
{1, 4, 5, 9, 10}; {3, 5, 6, 7, 8}; {2, 6, 7, 8, 10};
{1, 2, 3, 6, 7}; {1, 5, 6, 7, 10}; {5, 7, 8, 9, 10};
{2, 3, 7, 8, 9}; {1, 3, 5, 7, 9}; {1, 2, 7, 9, 10}


It can be checked that the parity of any of these sub-
sets will give s. Further, any subset that contains an
element of Γm as a subset can also perform reconstruc-
tion. Please note that this is not a threshold scheme,
there exist minimal authorized sets of size three and five.
III. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have given new methods to share clas-
sical secrets using quantum information. We have been
5able to strengthen the connection between quantum se-
cret sharing schemes and quantum error correcting codes
and given a new characterization of the access structure
in terms of minimal codewords. This characterization
is potentially of larger applicability, and its extension to
additive quantum codes and quantum secrets will be ex-
plored elsewhere.
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